Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

City of Orem v. Trindalynn Olson : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gregory V. Stewart; Dexter and Dexter; Attorney for Appellant.
Michael G. Barker; Orem City Prosecutor; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, City of Orem v. Olson, No. 20070047 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/27

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CITY OF OREM,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

APPELLEE'S BRIEF

Appellate No. 20070047-CA
TRINDALYNN OLSON,
Trial Court No. 051201426
Defendant/Appellant.
Priority No. 2

ON APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
THE HONORABLE JOHN C. BACKLUND PRESIDING

GREGORY V. STEWART (10848)
DEXTER & DEXTER, PC
1360 S. 740 E.
Orem, UT 84097
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant

MICHAEL G. BARKER (6475)
OREM CITY PROSECUTOR
56 North State Street
Orem, Utah 84057
Attorney for Appellee/Plaintiff

ORAL ARGUMENT IS UNNECESSARY IN THIS MATTER

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CITY OF OREM,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

APPELLEE'S BRIEF

Appellate No. 20070047-CA
TRINDALYNN OLSON,
Trial Court No. 051201426
Defendant/Appellant.
Priority No. 2

ON APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
THE HONORABLE JOHN C. BACKLUND PRESIDING

GREGORY V. STEWART (10848)
DEXTER & DEXTER, PC
1360 S. 740 E.
Orem, UT 84097
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant

MICHAEL G. BARKER (6475)
OREM CITY PROSECUTOR
56 North State Street
Orem, Utah 84057
Attorney for Appellee/Plaintiff

ORAL ARGUMENT IS UNNECESSARY IN THIS MATTER

LIST OF PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW
The following is a complete list of all the parties in the proceedings before the
Fourth District Court, State of Utah, Utah County, Orem Department:
The Honorable John C. Backhand, Judge, Presiding.
The City of Orem, Plaintiff, represented by Michael G. Barker.
Defendant, Trindalynn Olson, represented by Gregory V. Stewart.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement allows police to enter an
unattended, unlocked vehicle parked in a public parking lot to retrieve property which is
in plain view and has been identified as having been stolen?
In search and seizure cases, no deference is granted to the district court regarding
the application of law to underlying factual findings. State v. Alvarez, 206 UT 61, 147
P.3d425.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Fourth Amendment to the United State Constitution

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, nut upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953, as amended). Theft, acts constituting.

A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with the purpose to deprive him thereof.
3.

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405 (1953, as amended). Receiving stolen property,
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acts constituting.
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of
another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen, or
who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property
from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner
thereof.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, Tryndalynn Olson, (hereinafter "defendant") was cited by Officer
Wallace of the Orem Department of Public Safety for two counts each of Theft and
Possession of Stolen Property on September 8, 2005. R. 1. She was subsequently
charged by criminal information with the same charges. R. 2.
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on December 16, 2005. R. 33.
The court heard testimony on defendant's Motion To Suppress Evidence on January 24,
2006. R. 41. The parties were allowed to submit memoranda arguing the facts and law.
R. 40. Appellee, the City of Orem, (hereinafter "the City") filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion to Suppress on April 13, 2006. R. 48. The court issued a Ruling
On Motion To Suppress on April 20, 2006 in which it denied defendant's motion and
ordered the City to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the
City's memorandum. R. 50. The City submitted Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law on August 2, 2006. R. 55. The court signed an order denying defendant's motion on
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August 7, 2006. R. 57.
The parties subsequently filed a Conditional Plea Agreement in which the City
agreed to dismiss one count of Theft and one count of Possession of Stolen Property.
Defendant retained the right to appeal the court's denial of her Motion to Suppress
Evidence. R. 73. Defendant entered her pleas pursuant to the Conditional Plea
Agreement on December 7, 2006. R.80. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on January
5, 2007. R. 84.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

At approximately 1:23 p.m. on September 8, 2005, three police officers

from the Orem Department of Public Safety were dispatched to Famous Footwear at 292
West University Parkway in Orem, Utah. R. 28. They went there to investigate a
shoplifting report. R. 89:13. Two were in uniform and one was in plainclothes. R.
89:17. Two drove marked police cars and the other drove an unmarked Crown Victoria.
R. 89:17. They all parked within two or three stalls of a car later identified as
defendant's. R. 89:17, 18.
2.

Bonnie Smith ("Smith") was the assistant sales manager at Famous

Footwear. R. 89:3. She was familiar with the store's inventory control system and was
able to track inventory and sales on the store's computer system. R. 89:3, 4.
3.

Smith was working alone at the time this incident occurred. R. 89:4.

Defendant was in the store looking at shoes. R. 89:4. Smith's attention was drawn to
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defendant because defendant was carrying two large bags and was making a mess as she
looked at several pairs of shoes in the rear of the store. R. 89:5. Also, defendant was in
the back part of the store in an area in which people will try to shoplift. R. 89:5. The
store is equipped with bubble-type convex mirrors that assist store personnel to see the
back part of the store. R. 89:5.
4.

Smith offered to help defendant put away any shoes she wasn't interested in

buying. R. 89:5. Defendant declined and walked away holding a box containing a pair of
white and fuchsia K-Swiss running shoes. R. 89:6. The K-Swiss model in the box was a
new model in the store and had not been sold before. R.89:8. Defendant went around the
corner of a display. R. 89:6. Smith could still see defendant in a convex mirror mounted
on the wall. R. 89:6.
5.

Smith saw defendant put the box back on a shelf and then exit the store. R.

89:7. As defendant left the store without purchasing any merchandise, Smith noticed
defendant's bags appeared bulkier than they had been when she entered the store. R. 16,
R 89:19. Smith watched defendant go out to a car parked in front of the business and put
the bags inside. R. 89:7. Smith checked the box defendant placed on the shelf and
noticed it was empty. R. 89:6, 7. Smith did not pursue or otherwise confront defendant
because Smith was the sole employee in the store at the time. R. 89:10.
6.

Smith took the empty box to the front of the store. R. 89:8. Another

employee entered the store and asked Smith whether she had sold a pair of the new K-
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Swiss shoes? R. 89:8. Smith replied she hadn't. The other employee went out and
looked in defendant's car and saw a pair of the new-model K-Swiss shoes matching the
model missing from the empty box now in Smith's possession. R. 89:8, 12. Smith later
identified the shoes when shown them by an officer. R. 89:9.
7.

Smith called the police to report the theft. R. 89:8. While waiting for the

police to arrive, she checked the store's inventory system to determine whether a pair of
K-Swiss shoes matching those in defendant's car had previously been sold. Smith
determined that the shoes in the car should still be in inventory. R. 89:8.
8.

Lt. Giles ("Giles") arrived at the scene at approximately 1:37 p.m. R. 28, R.

89:30. He spoke with Smith and the other store employee. R. 89:14. The employees
told him what they had seen - how the defendant entered the store, looked at shoes,
declined assistance from Smith, left the store with her bag looking bulkier than it had
been when she entered the store, how Smith found the empty K-Swiss box and checked
inventory to see if that model had been sold, how the defendant put her bag in a car
parked outside the store, how the second store employee verified the same shoes that
should have been in the empty box were in the defendant's car. R. 89:19, 20. Giles then
went out to defendant's car and saw in plain view visible through any of the car's
windows the pair of K-Swiss shoes described by Smith and the other employee. R. 89:14,
23, 24. The car was parked in front of the store. It was unlocked and the keys were in the
ignition. R. 89:14. Wallace also saw the shoes in plain view from his vantage point
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outside the car. R. 89:37-39.
9.

Giles ran the car's license information in an attempt to find a phone number

to call the registered owner. R. 89:14. He located a phone number but was unable to
reach the registered owner. R. 89:15.
10.

While Giles was attempting to locate a phone number for the registered

owner, Office Gabe Santistevan ("Santistevan") went into businesses adjacent to Famous
Footwear trying to locate a person matching the suspect's description. R. 89:15. He was
unable to find anyone matching the suspect's description.
11.

After approximately forty-five minutes of trying to find defendant and/or

contact the registered owner of the car containing the shoes, Giles determined officers
needed to enter the car and seize the shoes rather than spend an indeterminate amount of
time waiting for defendant to return. R. 89:16, 17. Giles and Wallace retrieved the stolen
K-Swiss shoes and an empty K-Swiss box that did not match the shoes seized. R. 89:18,
21, 33. After seizing the shoes, Giles took the car keys and locked the door because there
was no responsible party present to ensure the security of the car. R. 89:26, 27.
12.

Giles left the scene, leaving Wallace in charge of the rest of the

investigation. R. 89:21, 32, Wallace took a written statement from Smith. R.16, R.
89:32. While Smith was filling out a written statement, defendant returned to her car. R.
89:32, 33, 38. Wallace issued her a citation. R. 1.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It is fundamental to our system of government that an officer must obtain a warrant
before conducting any search or seizure of property. U.S. Const, amend. IV.
Reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. "[Cjapacity to claim the
protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded
place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143 (1978).
The United States Supreme Court has stated " . . . searches and seizures conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject to only a few specifically
established and well delineated exceptions. Minnesota v. Dickerson. 508 U.S. 366, 372
(1993). Courts have carved out careful exceptions to the general rule. "We. . .have made
it clear that there are exceptions to the warrant requirement. When faced with special law
enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like,
the Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a
warrantless search or seizure reasonable." Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330
(2001). Exceptions to the warrant requirement include the plain view, abandonment, and
automobile exceptions. See e ^ Dickerson at 375; Abel v. U.S., 362 U.S. 217, 241
(1960); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).
Defendant removed shoes from Famous Footwear without paying for them. She
7

then placed the stolen shoes in her car, which was unlocked, and parked in a public
parking lot, in view of anyone passing by her car. Under the exceptions to the warrant
requirement listed above, defendant's actions obviated the need for the police to obtain a
warrant to seize the stolen shoes.
ARGUMENT
I.

INCRIMINATING ITEMS IN PLAIN VIEW MAY BE SEIZED WITHOUT
A WARRANT.
The plain view doctrine is a well-established exception to the warrant requirement

of the Fourth Amendment. See Dickerson. In Dickerson the Court stated that "[i]f police
are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is
immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they
may seize it without a warrant. Id at 375. The Court reasoned that a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband left in open view and thus there has been
no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment independent of the initial
intrusion by officers. Id. at 375.
In order to establish that a warrantless search complies with the plain view
doctrine, an officer must meet three criteria. First, the seizing officer must be lawfully
present and able to view the item without violating the Fourth Amendment. Second, the
item must be in plain view. Third, the incriminating nature of the item must be apparent.
See State v. Gallegos. 967 P.2d 973, 976 (UT App. 1998); State v. GrossL 2003 UT App
181,72P.3d686.
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Applying the facts in this case, it is clear that the plain view doctrine is applicable.
Defendant has conceded that officers met the first two prongs of the test. Appellant's
Brief at 11, 12. First, the officers were lawfully present and able to view the shoes
without violating the Fourth Amendment. Defendant's car was parked in a public parking
lot in a busy retail area. R. 89:7 Anyone passing by her car would have been able to see
inside and view the contents of the passenger compartment. Second, the item was in
plain view. Although testimony differed as to the exact location of the shoes within
defendant's car, three people were able to see the shoes in plain view - the unidentified
store clerk, Lt. Giles and Officer Wallace. R. 89:8, 12, 14, 23, 31.
At issue is whether officers met the third prong of the test. The City contends the
incriminating nature of the item in plain view was apparent. An item is clearly
incriminating if the officer has probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity.
See State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Utah Supreme Court
has defined what constitutes "probable cause":
"Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires
that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that certain items may be contraband or . . . useful as
evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such belief be
correct or more likely true than false." State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App 291,
f7, 141 P.3d 602 citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).
The item itself need not be inherently identifiable as contraband. "The presence of
commonplace items that would not arouse suspicion in a lay person may support probable
cause for a law enforcement officer when, in light of the circumstances and based on his
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experience and training, the items reasonably indicate a relation to illegal activity."
Griffith at \1.
Giles and Wallace did not need a warrant to enter defendant's car because they had
probable cause that the shoes they could see in the car were associated with criminal
activity. Giles, and to a lesser extent Wallace, had spoken with two witnesses employed
by Famous Footwear who provided details linking the shoes with a crime. R. 89:14.
Giles had learned that Smith had specifically seen defendant in the store in the area
of the store where the shoes were displayed for sale and that was also subject to
shoplifting activity. R. 89:19, 20. Smith saw defendant exit the store holding a bag that
appeared bulkier than it had been when Smith first encountered defendant. Id Smith saw
defendant place her bags in the car. Smith found an empty box that had contained shoes
of the same make and model at which defendant had been looking. Id Smith determined
that the particular model of K-Swiss shoes defendant looked at was missing from
inventory. Id The second store employee saw the shoes in defendant's car. Id All this
information evidencing a crime and the location of the stolen shoes was relayed to Giles
and Wallace.
Subsequently, when Giles and Wallace were standing in a lawful position from
which they could see the shoes matching the description given by the store employees,
they properly entered defendant's car and seized the shoes. They did not need a warrant
to do so.
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II.

DEFENDANT ABANDONED HER PRIVACY EXPECTATION
REGARDING PROPERTY IN HER VEHICLE BY LEAVING
STOLEN PROPERTY IN HER UNLOCKED CAR IN A PUBLIC
PLACE.

Recently, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the abandonment exception to the
warrant requirement. In State v. Rynhart 2005 UT 84, 125 P.3d 938, the court
considered a case where a Brigham City police officer discovered a single-vehicle
accident in which a van was parked in the middle of a private field. Based on evidence at
the scene, the officer deduced the accident had occurred a few hours earlier. In an
attempt to locate the owner of the van, the officer looked inside a purse left in the van.
He discovered a baggie containing a small quantity of cocaine. Defendant moved to
suppress the evidence. The trial court upheld the search under the emergency aid
doctrine. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed stating neither the emergency aid doctrine
nor the abandonment doctrine applied. The Utah Supreme Court reversed stating the
abandonment doctrine applied.
At the outset of its opinion the court stated there is a distinction between
abandonment in a property-law sense and abandonment in a constitutional sense. Id at
H14. A property law analysis asks whether a person has abandoned her right to possess
the property. Id Conversely, abandonment in a constitutional sense occurs when a
person relinquishes her reasonable expectation of privacy in the property. Id at ]f 15.
Thus, the issue in an abandonment case is not whether the defendant abandoned the right
to possess the property in question (i.e the van or the purse) but whether the defendant
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voluntarily abandoned her legitimate expectation of privacy in the items. Id at \21. "A
property owner need not intend to permanently relinquish ownership or possession to
forfeit a reasonable expectation of privacy; she need only leave an item unsecured in a
public place." kLat1J2l. See also California v. Greenwood 486 U.S. 35.40 (1988)
(concluding that putting your garbage out at the curb exposes it to public scrutiny); United
States v. Barlow. 17 F.3d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1994) ("A defendant has abandoned his
reasonable expectation of privacy when he leaves an item in a public place."). For the
City to prevail it must show by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant voluntarily
abandoned any legitimate privacy interest in the place to be searched. Rynhart at 1J21.
In this case, defendant voluntarily placed stolen shoes in her unlocked car parked
in a public parking lot and then left. R. 89:7. It is unknown where she went, but the
record supports the conclusion she was gone for a period of at least forty-five minutes. R.
89:16, 17, 30, 32. By being placed by defendant in her car, the shoes then became visible
to anyone who may be passing and glanced into the car. Defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding the shoes at that point. Courts have held there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 121, 122 (1985) ("It is well-settled that it is constitutionally reasonable for law
enforcement officials to seize "effects" that cannot support a justifiable expectation of
privacy without a warrant, based on probable cause to believe they contain contraband.").
If the court finds defendant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents
of her car, the City argues she abandoned that expectation when she left the stolen shoes
12

in her unsecured car in a public place.
III.

THE OFFICERS PROPERLY SEIZED THE STOLEN SHOES UNDER
THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
Pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement states an officer

may search without a warrant a vehicle if there is probable cause the vehicle contains
evidence or contraband and there are exigent circumstances. See State v. Brake, 2004 UT
95, 103 P.3d 699. The exception is based on a person's lesser expectation of privacy in a
vehicle and the mobility of the vehicle itself. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390
(1985) ('The capacity to be 'quickly moved' was clearly the basis of the holding in
Carroll and our cases have consistently recognized ready mobility as one of the principal
bases of the automobile exception."); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368
(1976) (stating the reasons for the automobile exception are twofold - the mobility of
vehicles and the fact that driving a vehicle necessarily brings a person into contact with
law enforcement under pervasive governmental regulation).
Under Utah law the automobile exception requires a showing of probable cause
and exigent circumstances. Brake at Tf25. Exigent circumstances are presumed when the
vehicle is capable of mobility, the occupants are alerted to police interest, and the
evidence could be destroyed while police obtain a warrant. See State v. Limb, 581 P.2d
142 (Utah 1978).
As argued above, officers had probable cause to believe defendant's car contained
evidence of a crime. Additionally, there were exigent circumstances. All three Limb
13

factors were present. The court could reasonably infer that defendant's car was capable
of mobility as she placed items in the car and left the keys in the ignition. R. 89:7, 14
Furthermore, the court could reasonably infer that defendant was alerted to police
presence as three officers responded to the scene; two were in uniform and one was in
plain clothes; and two drove marked patrol vehicles and the other an unmarked white
Crown Victoria. R. 89:17, 18, 31. The officers spent at least forty-five minutes at the
scene and even tried to canvas the other businesses in the strip mall. R. 89:16, 17, 30, 32.
Their presence at the scene was open to public view. Finally, the evidence in defendant's
car could have been destroyed while the officers obtained a warrant. Defendant had not
been identified and she left the car unlocked with the keys in the ignition which would
have facilitated a quick "getaway" from the scene.
Because probable cause and exigent circumstances were both present, Giles and
Wallace properly seized the stolen shoes from defendant's car without first obtaining a
warrant.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments the Court should uphold the trial court's denial
of defendant's Motion To Suppress Evidence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of September, 2007.

Michael G. Barker
Orem City Prosecutor
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